Correspondence theory of truth, but no correspondence
“The objection that may well have been the most effective in causing discontent with the correspondence theory is based on an epistemological concern. In a nutshell, the objection is that a correspondence theory of truth must inevitably lead into skepticism about the external world because the required correspondence between our thoughts and reality is not ascertainable. Ever since Berkeley’s attack on the representational theory of the mind, objections of this sort have enjoyed considerable popularity. It is typically pointed out that we cannot step outside our own minds to compare our thoughts with mind-independent reality. Yet—so the objection continues—on the correspondence theory of truth, this is precisely what we would have to do to gain knowledge. We would have to access reality as it is in itself, independently of our cognition of it, and determine whether our thoughts correspond to it. Since this is impossible, since all our access to the world is mediated by our cognition, the correspondence theory makes knowledge impossible (cf. Kant 1800, intro vii). Assuming that the resulting skepticism is unacceptable, the correspondence theory has to be rejected.” [Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: The Correspondence Theory of Truth]
I adhere to correspondence theory, and I accept the ensuing skepticism. As I’ve explained before, skepticism is not nihilistic, just agnostic. The above argument is absolutely brilliant, but not in the way intended (as a refutation of correspondence theory). Instead, it should be used in favor of the fictionalist response to skepticism.
In case anyone recalls the contradicting things I’ve said about correspondence theory in the past, I have a confession to make: I discovered only this past autumn that I’ve held an embarrasingly misunderstood version of it ever since I first learned about it. I thought it always implied the positive assertion that reality in fact does correspond to (some of) our thoughts in some sense. But of course, it doesn’t. One can adhere to correspondence theory and deny the possibility of actually achieving correspondence. This is my position. It’s good that I finally got this cleared up, because relating to correspondence theory makes my position a lot easier to communicate.
It seems to me that this argument against correspondence theory only entails that the definition of the theory needs some adjustment. If we define correspondence more probabilistically, then the existential assertion suits the data. So a true statement just becomes a statement that meets the requisite probability requirements based on the standards by which one judges correspondence probability of any given statement. I believe it to be true that there is a computer in front of me not because I have some sort of direct intuition of its existence. Rather, the sensory data that I have collected on the object in front of me indicates that it is most likely a computer. And the fact that it functions as such makes it absurd to believe any other theory about what this object is. It would be crazy for me to say that a thing that looks and acts like a computer is not a computer because the probability of finding out that it is actually not a computer are microscopic.
It should not surprise us that the knowledge we have about our own minds is both firmer and of a different kind than the knowledge we have about the world the mind experiences. This is just common sense.
Interpreting correspondence probabilistically would transform the correspondence theory of truth into something else entirely, like pragmatism. That, by itself, is okay, even respectable, but what I’m interested in here is the stronger version of correspondence theory; reinterpreting it like you do is just avoiding the problem I’d like to confront.
To your example with the computer in front of you: What is this computer you are referring to? Is it the real thing, or merely your conception of what a computer is? If it is the latter, then your claim is simply that what you see corresponds to a thought or an idea. This kind of correspondence is internal to the human domain. To take the problem seriously, you have to claim something about the thing as it is independently of us. And if that is what you’re trying to do with your example, I’d say that you probably misunderstand the quote we’re talking about.
Of course, you are right that it is absurd to believe just anything about our experiences. Some beliefs work, others are completely misplaced. But what do we believe about our beliefs? That they correspond (in the strong sense) to mind-independent reality? Or that they are useful fictions, virtual constructs to make sense of input data from our senses, but without a true connection to mind-independent reality? They can manifest the mentioned properties (working or being misplaced) in both cases.
If the strength of the belief is not matched by the justification the belief has, then there are definite implications about these sorts of beliefs. We ought to recognize that we do not have an immediate knowledge of the world the way we have an immediate knowledge of our minds. This means that believing that one’s particular vision of the world is the One True Theory is simply not rationally supported. It is okay to have such beliefs, but we have to realize that they are never anything more than a belief. Just so, without what you call pragmatic justification for our beliefs about the outside world, we have no justification whatsoever. If we reject the reconstructive empirical theories that inductive reasoning brings us then we have nothing else left with which to support our empirical beliefs. Why should there be any a priori justification for belief in the existence of the outside world when the only contact we have with it is a posteriori?
Because no conscious knowledge and no rational inquiry of ours brings us to consensus about the nature of the outside world, we can reasonably conclude that none ever will. Putnam, Quine and Kripke’s Wittgenstein have shown this to be true of interpersonal language. It is also widely known to be true of scientific theories.
To believe that the world is exactly as quantum mechanics and special relativity, as they are, say that it is is to believe that these theories are final and complete. And if we do not allow any probabilistic slack in our correspondence theory, then we cannot accept a correspondence theory about science.
But inductive reasoning works just the same way at the personal level (science being the interpersonal level), so any belief that one’s personal theory of everything is, in fact, a final and perfect theory amounts to an unwillingness to allow the requisite probabilistic slack which matches the belief that we SHOULD have.
I know that my belief in the Flying Spaghetti Monster is not a belief that I can ever motivate you to accept. I can tell you every possible justification for it, but nothing I tell you can bring you all the way to belief. What is required for belief in the FSM is a private motivation, an issue of taste, an inference based on premises which are not true of anyone but myself.
So if you ask me whether my belief that my beliefs correspond to the outside world is a useful fiction or whether it is some arcane knowledge that I have and can never give to you, I will respond that we are not asking the right question. The right question is “What SHOULD my belief that my beliefs correspond to the outside world be?”
This is an issue of epistemological responsibility. It is not an issue of the de facto state of affairs.
-Priam’s Pride
I agree with everything you say in the first couple of paragraphs. I don’t reject pragmatism at all, quite the contrary. But it belongs in the domain of science, not in philosophy, at least not metaphysics, which is my concern in this context.
I don’t think I understand exactly what you’re getting at about FSM and personal beliefs, but I suspect I disagree quite profoundly. I reject the classical separation of the subjective and the objective, which it seems like you’re making use of. In my view, they share the ontological status of virtuality. The fact that some things are easier to communicate than others does not justify a claim that some things are inherently and absolutely private. I can see that we have good social reasons to uphold the complete sovereignty of the individual when it comes to certain topics (like taste and religion), but such reasons do not make for good philosophical argument. I suppose you’d point to other and better reasons though. If you care to explain, I’m all ears.
I don’t understand your “right question”. I don’t know what you mean with epistemological responsibility. It seems to me (based on a guess) that you’re promoting taking some shortcuts in a metaphysical landscape, skipping over the drawing up of the map, which is what philosophy is all about.
Update: If that’s the case, then again I agree, but only in a domain outside of philosophy (or at least metaphysics). It is only wise to not uphold one’s every action to the standard of meticulousness required by theoretical philosophy. The world does and should look completely different from a practical perspective.
I apologize for the shortcut. I am trying to get out of that habit: it was merely an elliptical mistake. I will begin with the part of my response that you agreed with. Hopefully I can come to answering your objection that way.
Even if there is no One True Theory, one can imagine that it would still be possible to conceive of a unified theory which explained all of the significant phenomena that we experience. In fact, because the data are not sufficient to determine a single such unified theory, one could conceive multiple unified theories which describe the phenomena that we experience.
In other words, philosophy as a whole seems to be dealing with multiple simultaneous attempts at explaining all of the phenomena in a unified fashion. Anti-Realism and Realism are two sorts of explanations. Religious explanations also appear in philosophy. And Heideggerians and Post-Modernists clearly think that they have an explanation of the phenomena which is quite different from all the rest.
We may find that we are dealing with a set of theories whose explanatory power must be judged in other ways. Pragmatic judgments do, in fact, already occur. It seems that theories are to be judged, these days, in terms of how much they have to assume as basic. Realists must assume some abstract-world to be basic in addition to the physical world. Materialists and idealists both make a single basic assumption.
One can imagine a theory in which sixty-five different basic claims were made. This would amount to the need to describe sixty-five different types of things about which descriptions would not overlap. For in any dualism, we cannot describe the material world in the same terms as the immaterial world. So we would have sixty-five different institutions with which to study the particular phenomena that we have taken as basic. For in taking a phenomenon as basic, we are essentially claiming that this phenomenon is one of the most worth-while things to study, for it supports and shapes all the rest. The premises always shape and determine the argument, not the other way around.
So the explanation with the fewest basic phenomena and the greatest explanatory power seems to be the one that is ideal. For no one wants to have to have 65 different sciences. One or two are enough. This is why belief in anything higher than dualism is rarely discovered.
So we already do judge our theories in a way that is purely pragmatic. But suppose that a choice between two theories occurs in which even pragmatic preference cannot determine which theory you choose. Whatever the choice is made by, it is neither reason nor prudence. So if we find people having ontological disagreements that are not solved by means of either reason or enticement, then we should not be surprised.
The fact that there are so many religions and so many philosophical positions does not, however, entail that determination of theory must be private. However, the multiplicity of putative unified theories (all of whom claim, of course, to be the One True Theory) clearly shows us that the motivations and reasons are not currently available to determine which theory ought to be adopted. So when I give you all the reasons and motivations in favor of FSM that I can think of, I would expect that you still will not be swayed. This is because the theories have not been worked out enough to provide me the tools to pry you apart from the private motivations by which you have adopted your (non-FSM) theory.
And it is not philosophically uninteresting that religion and taste are matters of privacy. For example, if philosophy explained everything, then we would have no need for religion. Thus, one must either assume that it will explain everything (including matters religious); or that it lacks the ability to explain all of the phenomena, in which case the burden of proof is probably on you.
So if philosophy can bring one all the way to a unified theory which we can all be brought to share (regardless of whether it has anything like correspondence to some outside world), then we might as well take this unified theory as true. That is, if philosophy could somehow unify itself and then establish itself as the logical ancestor to all pursuits of knowledge (as it seems to try to do at times), then we would probably say that we have found the truth. But this “truth” would be (partially) pragmatically constructed. There would still be alternate logical explanations, such as an explanation that took 65 different substances as basic. These would be unnecessarily tedious, you might say. But why should truth not be even more tedious than it is? If pragmatism can motivate our usage of the word “true”, then it seems that truth has a different meaning that most think it does. To reject a field of research because it is unnecessary for explaining the phenomena already seems to reject the standard correspondence theory of truth. If correspondence theory is what people take to be common sense, then they ought to re-examine their common sense, because pragmatic decisions are made about truth on a regular basis. So it seems as if our ordinary concept of truth is just a sufficient theory about the phenomena.
But there are alternate theories and the theory that you accept you cannot completely motivate me to accept as well. This is because the relevant arguments have not been constructed and the relevant experiments not yet performed: there is no complete unified theory yet. So how do you construct your own personal theory?
The question might be asked, “do we need a personal theory?” I would say that it is only in response to the world that we interpret to exist that we find ourselves able act. If I thought that there existed a Christian God, then I would act much differently than if I thought there was a Flying Spaghetti Monster. So my judgment about whether there exists a God or a Flying Spaghetti Monster is in some way determinate of my ethics, so I must already have a belief about whether they exist when I act.
But this cannot be said, apparently, for the agnostic. Well, there are certain “game time” decisions that the agnostic may have to make. This will occur whenever the agnostic is presented with an ethical dilemma in which the pragmatic benefits are not clear. So perhaps (in America), you find that you have to fire a woman with some a chronic illness that demands frequent medical attention and whose only source of medical insurance is her job. Is it better to take the consequences of firing or is it better to let her deal with her own problem? You will find that agnosticism about all things indeterminate will not bring you to a decision.
So regardless of how it happens that you fill in the details of your version of the One True Theory, these motivations will insulate your unified theory from mine. I cannot feel the force of your subjective motivations in filling in the gaps of the explanatory theory you adopt, because they are purely subjective. The point I was trying to make was that taste enters the picture even at the philosophical level. And until these private theoretical commitments can be publicly proven obsolete, then there is really no difference between matters of taste and concepts that are private.
So we are forced to have private commitments in our theories. But it seems that public reasoning has at least come far enough to show us that we lack the capability to change each others private commitments through any discourse, so we ought to recognize that there is nothing gained in spiting each other for having different unified theories.
In other words, we should be able to recognize by now that reason at least gets us this far: we are ethically bound to recognize that our beliefs are only useful fictions. To take such private beliefs as arcane and private knowledge is unfair to everyone else who simply has to take your word for it. To consider such an action ethical is to be an ethical solipsistic. But solipsism is at least one theory that can be pragmatically ruled out.
I suspect that we are in agreement at the end of the day, though I don’t know much about what you call “virtualism”. What I wanted to provide you with is my motivation of the particular brand of truth that comes out of a redefinition of correspondence. I am also suggesting the possibility of establishing an ethics based on this concept.
-Priam’s Pride
Thank you for this thorough exposition. I do plan to respond, but don’t have time until the weekend.
I agree that there necessarily is an element of meta-theoretical pragmatism in our judgment.
But I don’t see why theories necessarily involve the pretension of being the only possible truth. In fact, if we leave the word truth out of it entirely, we escape the problems you rightfully raise (about the logically possible if impractical alternatives).
Pragmatism does not motivate my usage of the word “true”, but I agree with your point. The ordinary or naive concept of truth is in denial of its own pragmatism.
Agnosticism is not very good at informing our everyday lives or practical decisions of any kind really. To try to substitute a complete belief system with agnosticism will make you a better theoretical philosopher, but more confused and neurotic in life outside the mental workshop. My solution to this is fictionalism: I allow myself to believe in things I know to be fictional (just in everyday life, not in theoretical philosophy). Most of the time it’s just about actively using simplifications, but I allow even religious or superstitious concepts. In particular free will and a notion about a pure good.
I agree that taste enters the picture at the philosophical level, and think this is a profound point. It is a real obstacle to communication, but I think this wall will be breached to some degree by advances in communication technology in a not so distant future.
I think we do agree more than I originally thought. But we’re working on different fields, in relation to which we define terms like truth differently. Loosely, I’m working on theoretical philosophy and metaphysics, you’re working on meta-theory and ethics.
If in a non-philosophical context, you find yourself believing things that you do not believe in a philosophical context, then it seems as if you have devised a philosophy which is practically useless. (And I make no claim about whether this hypothetical applies to you in particular.) In order to prevent the uselessness of theoretical philosophy, we ought to seek a rectification of ordinary beliefs with philosophical ones. In other words, we cannot accept things that are intuitively and practically impossible to accept. Such beliefs as solipsism, the non-existence of the physical world, and the possibility of all laws ceasing to hold at some future point in time are good examples of philosophical positions which are practically untenable.
Should you find yourself holding one of these absurd philosophical positions, you will find that you are forced to split your personality in two for the sake of your divergent beliefs (though not in a clinically insane way). If contradiction is to be rejected, then it is to be rejected in all contexts — including belief contexts. So if you find yourself puzzled by the fact that you believe in free-will and a “pure good”, then if you wish to retain your theory (virtualism), you will have to confront these apparent contradictions.
Though the form of fictionalism to which I adhere seems quite similar to what you call virtualism, I do not think that these problems must bring me into a practical contradiction. If you are willing to redefine the word “truth”, then you should at least try to redefine it such that no contradictions are entailed. In fact, I think that such a definition is possible. Fictionalism’s redefinition of “truth” begins with a single premise which claims to be inductively true: multiple unified theories of everything can be had which are mutually exclusive and equally rational. Any problems that one theory might have are usually solved in the context of another theory. Thus, if one treats all theories as false, one may pick and choose which theory to adopt when. Thus, what is “true” is what most faithfully describes the phenomena.
But recall the absurd beliefs that I mentioned earlier. If the most faithful description of the physical world is some sort of objective existence independent of the mind (and science tells us that it is), then it is a description that a good fictionalist should call “true”.
The question I am raising is this (and you mention it in your most recent post): why must fictionalism be self-referential? If fictionalism provides the means by which we can decide which parts of which theories are true (in pragmatic terms), then the only way to avoid a circular definition of truth is if fictionalism, itself, is left out of the definition. This much seems intuitive to me, considering that fictionalism does not provide any independent descriptions of the world — it is parasitic on theoretical descriptions which already exist (i.e. those theories which it describes as fictions). Thus, fictionalism acts as a single unified theory just like any other, except that it is able to encompass all the others. So rather than being an anti-theoretical theory, fictionalism is instead a supreme theory.
Though I am not going to go into it right now, I think that a good definition of fiction can eliminate the problems of contradiction that you seem to be dealing with. In effect, fiction can act as a basic substance from which all theory is born, should a successful attempt at securing fiction be enacted. Thus, your troubles with irrational optimism and free-will may neatly reduce to fictional terms and then there is no more contradiction.
At the end of the day, though, I think you are right: our interests are simply different. Where I look for a theoretical foundation, you look for theoretical solutions. Perhaps we each hope to find the one through the other.
-Priam’s Pride
P.S. I appologize if this post was particularly stream of consciousness. There is only so much time for the editing of comments.
“If in a non-philosophical context, you find yourself believing things that you do not believe in a philosophical context, then it seems as if you have devised a philosophy which is practically useless.”
Substitute philosophy for physics in the above. Does that seem useless as well?
Of course we can accept, or at least explore, ideas that go against intuition and what is practical in ordinary circumstances. If we denied ourselves this, science wouldn’t have gotten off the ground. And the same applies to philosophy. Exploring weird ideas like solipsism, nihilism etc. is necessary to understand how our minds work. In my terminology: the possible properties of virtuality.
Belief is a strong word. I don’t like using it without carefully qualifying that, as I understand belief, it is always “ironic” in some degree, i.e. I’m hesitant to single out anything as something I actually believe is true. Belief is like immersion, a technique to focus better by excluding every other possible belief for a moment. Thus, believing in something is not committing to it. The only thing I’m able to commit to, is virtualism, perhaps just because it is an all-inclusive framework.
In virtualism, there is no theoretical reason why contradiction (between perspectives) is to be rejected. But there are practical reasons, as we’re designed by evolution to live (immersively) in one and only one reality. It goes against out nature to split our minds in compartments. And so we struggle with this. I know I do. I need to make a “perspectival home” for myself. I venture out to alien perspectival worlds when doing philosophy, and return home when I need to breathe more easily.
About the word “truth”: I don’t like applying this to conceptions about reality that are merely pragmatically justified. I reserve the word to only what is absolutely true, i.e. virtual truths. I don’t think your question about self-referentiality is affected by my refusal to define truth as you do though.
To answer the question: I don’t think it is wise to leave fictionalism out of its own scope, because that would make it a dogmatic theory as far as its foundation is concerned, and its subject matter would have to be artificially limited to exclude it. Although on the other hand, I guess there is an element of dogmatism to even a foundation in circularity: A dogmatic decision to jump into the circle in the first place is needed to get the thing going.
Self-referential fictionalist metaphysics is not anti-theoretical. Why do you say that? And supposing you’re right, how exactly does your proposed alternative evade the same charge?
I completely agree with what you say about the concept of fiction being able to eliminate problems of contradiction, and be the basis of a “supreme theory”. I count this among the core insights of virtualism, and am very glad you eye the same opportunity.
“Substitute philosophy for physics in the above. Does that seem useless as well?
Of course we can accept, or at least explore, ideas that go against intuition and what is practical in ordinary circumstances. If we denied ourselves this, science wouldn’t have gotten off the ground. And the same applies to philosophy. ”
I understand and agree with this, but you have misinterpreted the phrase you quoted (and understandably so). A good theory which has counter-intuitive aspects to it will explain why we have the intuitions in the first place. Relativistic physics, for example, can explain why we have the intuition that there is an absolute space against which all measurement occurs. This is because the speeds at which we move are so low that the relativistic effects are undetectable. Similarly, the counter-intuitive events of quantum mechanics (e.g. quantum tunneling, the EPR effect) only have significant probabilities of occurring on atomic and sub-atomic levels. When considering large amounts of matter, the quantum features smooth out.
If a counter-intuitive position, such as atheistic idealism, is to taken as tenable then it ought to explain the intuition that the physical world exists by having a mechanism that causes this intuition. Berkeley could only explain the intuition that the physical world exists by positing a God who thinks thoughts before we think them. This God could then be the reason that my room looks the same way I left it two hours ago. Otherwise, we cannot explain the coherence of sensory input. But atheistic idealists cannot account for the coherence of sensory input, so their theories are hopelessly counter-intuitive.
A good version of fictionalism should account for all intuitions by preserving as many as possible on face-value, and providing adequate causal explanations for the rest. This is nothing more than requiring the simplest explanation possible (Occam’s razor). Of course, there are other important standards by which we govern meta-theory, but there are conceviable theoretical explanations of the world in which positing the absolute existence of something is the simplest explanation possible. In fact, due to the problem that any instance of human experience seem to require the absolute existence of both matter and mind (perceiver/perceived), it seems obvious that at least two dogmatic claims (viz. ‘matter exists’ and ‘mind exists’) would provide an elegant and simple explanation for the apparent intuition that there is are subjects and objects. In short, the simplest explanation for the broad distinction in experience between that which I do voluntarily (the thinking) and that which happens to me passively (that about which we think, the world) is a dualism.
There is no need to assume a coherence theory of knowledge, because a coherence theory is already precluded by the passive nature of the sensory Given. Therefore, we ought to search for a prudent and wise set of initial axioms out of which to build our theory of everything (or TOE, if you will).
Positing a mind/matter dualism is a good sound way to support fictionalism without requiring circularity. If fictions are mental constructions of imaginary worlds, then fictionalism becomes a mentalism about all human communication. Suppose that fictions are mental acts of imaginary construction. And when a fiction is discussed in a community, the entire community is imagining the fictional world together. This mentalist fictionalism reduces all linguistic communication to different types of fictional worlds, each with its own language to describe the world. There are, then, fictional worlds of mathematics, literature, logic, computer programming, etc. Each of these is a communal participation in an act of make-believe: a purely mental event. If we posit the absolute existence of the mind, then there is no need for circular support.
In fact, I don’t know how much work you have done on Wittgenstein, but his Philosophical Investigations provide a very strong argument that language cannot be used to support itself circularly. I happen to agree with him, and I think I have a very strong argument in favor of this claim: that there is a degree to which at least some meanings must be taken as basic and unanalyzable. This is because, of course, the mind thinks in languages — even if the language is logic.
These two facts lead me to believe that absolute knowledge can be had, so long as one is willing to assume two dogmatic axioms (mind & matter) based on rational prudence.
Fictionalist metaphysics is not anti-theoretical. It is just meta-theoretical. This means that it does not actually do any theoretical work of its own; rather, it describes how theoretical work is to be done. This is why it cannot be self-referential. If it were, then it would be regressive, but regress is exactly what a meta-theory is supposed to guard against. Therefore, fictionalism is not chosen from a set of theories. It is chosen from a set of fundamental axioms. These axioms then produce their own theories. But fictionalism produces all alternate theories, which none of the alternate sets of axioms do.
I agree with most of what you say here. I’m not sure about the foundation of virtualism though, I have to think more about it. If I get things my way, my thesis will be on this subject, and the question of foundation will have to be dealt with.
Fictionalism as a term is associated with a view much weaker than what we’re talking about here, that’s why I’m trying to use virtualism instead. But perhaps you don’t accept the computational premise implied by this word?
To your last comment: As you know, I agree that fictionalism is able to produce all alternate theories within itself. But how is it itself to be excluded from this production? Just dogmatically? I don’t accept that. I’d rather explore the ramifications of circularity, which I believe will turn out to be nothing more than recognizing the fact that there are singularities similar to black holes to be found in mental/virtual space. And just like black holes does not cause physical space to collapse, the existence of singularities in virtual space is no reason for us to collapse into a position of nihilism or rigid agnosticism or something like that.
I want to say again that pyrrhonistic skepticism is what you are calling fictionalist… there is no coorespondence provable in reality, but there are models (fictions) that we adopt because they appear apt.
I don’t like calling them fictions because they are based on perceptive facts.
Thing is, there is a better correspondence available, not between our models and reality, which we cannot know in itself, but between our models and our stream of perceptions. It also leads to skepticism because we are still getting perceptions, more information, and the models will have to adapt… but it also gives us a relative definition of truth. Something is more true if it matches our perceptions with more accuracy.
“I believe it to be true that there is a computer in front of me not because I have some sort of direct intuition of its existence. Rather, the sensory data that I have collected on the object in front of me indicates that it is most likely a computer.”
my solution is that it’s true that there is a computer in front of you because that’s what you call the collection of perceptions you are getting… “a computer” and it does not matter if the computer is really “a computer in itself” or some other phenomenon… it still is the thing you call a computer and the perceptions related to it are those “of a computer” by definition. Whethere it’s there or you are dreaming, it is a computer.
e.g. agent A says “I dreamed I was at a computer”… really? in a dream? why did you call it a computer? because the bundle of perceptions you got is called “a computer” and to distinguish between that and a “real” computer you still use perceptions, but a wider set, which involves distinctions between sense perceptions and phantasmal perceptions.
These points are where we differ. I think only a small subset of virtuality is modelled on the basis of evidence from perception — and that models with any degree of purity (i.e. clean from corruption by other interests) are very hard to achieve and maintain over time. Even nonsense is more predominant than evidence-based models. Most of our mental content is built on the basis of guidelines from a shouting poll of a wide range of interests. For these reasons, I think of pure, non-applied virtuality as primary. I’ll elaborate on this in a future post.